Philosophy of Socrates: Book Reviews Essay

January 13, 2022 by Essay Writer

In the book I of the republic, why does Socrates think that it is never just for one person to injure another, whether a friend or an enemy?

In their dialogue, Socrates and Polemarchus discuss what may be considered the philosophical implications of the notion of justice. According to Polemarchus, this notion can be defined in terms of one’s ability to treat good people well and to strive to harm those, who due to being wicked, deserve to be treated wickedly. Socrates challenges this point of view by suggesting that it is in one’s very nature to make wrong judgments, as to what can be deemed his friends and enemies. In other words, there can be no 100% guarantee that, while referring to a particular person as an enemy, one will be acting in a thoroughly appropriate manner. The same applies to a person’s commitment to treat its friends in the best way possible – the individuals in question may not be just as friendly, as it appears to be the case.

What it means is that, while living up to Polemarchus’s view on justice, people will inevitably contribute to increasing the amount of injustice in the world. This, of course, implies that the mentioned definition of justice cannot be thought of as such that represents an undisputed truth-value.

While continuing to argue that it is never justified for one person to be trying to injure another, Socrates points out the fact that the very assumption that wicked people deserve to be punished, does not hold much water. In this respect, he comes up with the example of a would-be-punished horse, which in the punishment’s aftermath will not cease being what it is. The same can be said about people – being subjected to punishment, will not result in the qualitative transformation of their existential essence. What it means is that injuring others for the sake of reestablishing justice, cannot be considered a right thing to do, by definition.

According to Socrates, the earlier mentioned considerations mean only one thing – a truly virtuous individual will be trying to do his best while treating others – regardless of whether the would-be-affected individuals happened to be his friends or enemies. This, of course, establishes certain discursive parallels between the philosophy of Socrates, in respect of how it tackles the notion of justice, and that of Jesus.

In the book I of the republic, what is Socrates’ reply to Thrasymachus’s idea that unjust people are stronger and more powerful than just people?

While trying to convince Thrasymachos that there can be very little rationale in believing that unjust individuals are being more powerful, as opposed to what happened to be the case with their fair counterparts, Socrates mentions the following:

a) One’s tendency to treat others unjustly is nothing but an indication of the concerned individual’s perceptual arrogance. Consequently, those who happened to be arrogant cannot possibly expect that, while confronting wise people, they will be able to gain an upper hand. The reason for this is apparent – perceptually arrogant people will be less likely to adopt a circumstantially appropriate stance while facing a particular challenge, as compared to their not-so-arrogant counterparts.

b) Individuals, known for their unjust ways, will inevitably end up having a particularly hard time while trying to cooperate. The reason for this is that, while treating others unfairly, people automatically expose themselves as such that can be hardly trusted. Enough, this will not result in anything else but in undermining these people’s ability to form alliances with each other, which in turn will hurt the measure of their existential competitiveness.

c) Just as it happened to be the case with different parts of one’s body, there is a clearly defined purpose to the existence of a person, as a whole. However, since an individual’s life is being commonly discussed in the evaluative terms (‘good’/’bad’), this presupposes that there must be an intrinsic quality to just about anyone’s soul. Consequently, this can be seen as the proof that, even though many unjust people do prove themselves rather effective, when it comes to claiming their place under the Sun, their success, in this respect, is being of a rather tactical than strategic nature. This, of course, implies that only evenhanded people can be considered truly powerful.

As the final proof to the validity of the idea that it is much better to be a just individual, as opposed to being an unjust one, Socrates mentions the fact that one’s strong commitment to the virtue of justice qualifies the concerned individual to be able to experience happiness – something that is being commonly perceived as the actual purpose of just about anyone’s life.

In Phaedo, Socrates maintains that to engage in philosophy is to practice dying. Explain what he means and why he says this

In the Phaedo, Socrates proclaims that to be considered a true philosopher, one must be attracted to the idea of dying. The line of Socrates’s reasoning, in this respect, can be outlined as follows:

All of the people, suggests Socrates, are endowed with some kind of intrinsic knowledge, which they seem to possess since the time of their birth, and which can be ‘recalled’, during the process of them interacting with the physical emanations of the surrounding reality. Socrates compares it to how people instantly recall their loved ones, after having caught sight of some physical item that used to belong to them. Therefore, our whole lives are nothing but the process of recollecting our long-lost essence, as individuals. In its turn, this implies that we have existed before ending up incarnated in our present physical bodies. This brings Socrates to conclude that one’s soul is nothing but a ‘thing-in-itself’, much like the ideas of beauty, ugliness, tallness, hungriness, perfection, etc. To substantiate this idea, Plato refers to fire as an example. Fire relates to the notion of heat, but never to the notion of coldness. The same can be said about the soul – since the notion of the soul is synonymous with the notion of life, the former cannot possess the subtleties of death, by definition. In its turn, this implies that one’s soul exists forever – quite unlike what happened to be the case with his or her body.

This, of course, implies both: that the soul is immortal and that philosophically-minded individuals should not be afraid of the thought of dying. After all, in light of the above stated, the concerned process can be well-referred to as being ‘enlightening’, in the sense of allowing a philosopher to come closer to understanding how the universe operates. According to Socrates, it is specifically an individual’s commitment to trying to grow ever wiser about the ways of the world, which stands out as the clearest indication that he is indeed a highly virtuous person. Because, as it was pointed out earlier, whatever is being commonly referred to as the ‘soul’ Socrates proclaims to be the source of all knowledge, this naturally brought him to conclude that, while living their lives, the wisdom-seeking philosophers should try to remain as much ‘detached’ from their bodies, as possible. Hence, the beneficence of dying – it is something that brings this detachment to a completely new level.

Explain Socrates’ three objections to the “harmony” theory of the soul that simmers puts forward in Phaedo?

According to Simmias, one’s soul can be compared to the harmony of sounds, created by a playing harp. This, however, means that the soul is mortal – just as there can be no music without a harp, there can be no soul without a body. While challenging this idea, Socrates came up with the following objections:

a) In this world, there is a dialectical relationship between what appear to be two mutually opposite notions. For example, whatever is currently being deemed ‘big’, must have been ‘small’ at some point in its existence. This presupposes that these types of notions organically derive out of each other, which in turn supports the idea of the soul’s immortality – one’s birth can be discussed as such that came about because the concerned individual died in another body back in the past.

b) There are many notions, the discursive significance of which we recognize instantaneously, despite have not been provided with the chance to attain any experiential knowledge, in this respect. This, of course, presupposes both: the existence of non-material ideas as ‘things-in-themselves’ and the possibility for one’s soul to be immortal. After all, the most logical explanation to the mentioned phenomena is that, as they live their lives, people simply ‘recall things’ – something that could not possibly be the case, had the soul been solely the attribute of a person’s physical body.

c) Had the conceptualization of the soul as ‘harmony’ (which implies its mortality) been legitimate, the physical state of one’s body would have a direct effect on the aspirations of his or her soul, just as the physical state of a harp affects the quality of music it plays. This, however, is far from being the case. After all, there are many people that despite being through their advanced years, nevertheless appear to be ‘young at heart’. What is more, in many cases people appear to be fully capable of acting in a manner that can hardly be considered beneficial to their physical bodies – something that comes as a result of the concerned individuals’ ability to exercise control over their animalistic urges. This again suggests that the soul is not solely the property of the affiliated body – it is something that makes this body to act in one way or another, which in turn presupposes the ‘superiority’ of spirit over the flesh.

In book VII of the republic, what is Socrates’ explanation of the meaning of the parable of this cave?

In Book VII of the Republic, Socrates engages in dialogue with Plato’s brother Glaucon, while trying to enlighten the latter onto the true essence of ontological knowledge, as an objective category. He presents Glaucon with the vision of the cave, which contains prisoners chained to the walls. These prisoners had spent their whole lives inside of this cave ever since the time they were born, with only the link that was connecting them to the outside have been the shadows of people moving in front of the cave’s entrance, projected onto the wall in front of prisoners’ eyes. Given the fact that the prisoners had never been outside of this cave, the shadows of moving objects they are being exposed to and also the sounds, associated with these objects, are only the mean for them to make judgments about the realities of the outside world. It is needless to say, of course, that the prisoners’ idea as to what this world might be all about, would have very little to do with the actual state of affairs, in this respect. Thus, Socrates implies that our sensory perception of the surrounding environment may not necessarily be thoroughly adequate, because it can be well assumed that what we see with our eyes is being only partially reflective of the perceived objects’ true essence, as abstract ideas.

After having established the conceptual premise of his argument, Socrates moves on to describe what will happen if a few prisoners end up being allowed to venture outside of the cave. According to the philosopher, as a consequence of this, these prisoners will end up regarding their former worldviews thoroughly fallacious, because they would realize that the world outside of the cave is so much more than they used to think of it. As a result, the concerned individuals will experience the sensation of awe/happiness, which in turn will prompt them to try to educate the rest of the prisoners in the cave that the world is not what they believed it was. The enlightened prisoners, however, would not be able to succeed in it – the rest of the imprisoned individuals will simply end up calling them liars.

Hence, the discursive significance of the ‘allegory of the cave’ – we are being surrounded by the invisible (metaphysical) reality, the existence of which one may construe from several what can be considered this existence’s implicit ‘signs’. The fact that this reality cannot be perceived directly does not make it less real. It is understood, of course, that this justifies the quasi-religious outlook on what may account for one’s life.

References

Rouse, W. H. (1956). Great dialogues of Plato.

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